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 Executive Summary 
 
This article attempts, empirically, to explain the value that lawyers add when acting as 
counsel to parties in business transactions. Contrary to existing scholarship, which is based 
mostly on theory, this article shows that transactional lawyers add value primarily by reducing 
regulatory costs, thereby challenging the reigning models of transactional lawyers as “transaction 
cost engineers” and “reputational intermediaries.” This new model not only helps inform 
contract theory but also reveals a profoundly different vision than existing models for the future 
of legal education and the profession.  
 1 
Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering 
 




Everyone understands the value of lawyers as litigators, but for decades scholars have 
attempted to explain what value lawyers add in their quintessential role as counsel to parties in 
the negotiating, contract drafting, and opinion giving process
1 leading to “closing”
2 a 
commercial, financing, or other business transaction (lawyers performing this role being 
hereinafter referred to as “transactional lawyers” or “transactional counsel”
3).
4 To date, the 
efforts of scholars mostly reflect pure theory, occasionally tempered by isolated anecdotes.
5 As a 
result, their findings are intrinsically questionable.  
  The scholarly findings are also both overly broad and incomplete. Professors Gilson, 
Mnookin, and Gardner argue, for example, that transactional lawyers add value primarily by 
reducing transaction costs, acting as reputational intermediaries, anticipating and counseling 
clients about risks and outcomes, identifying differences in valuation between parties, and 
creating economies of scope.
6 To a large extent, however—as Professor Gilson himself 
                                                 
1 This process may include such incidental roles as helping to structure the transaction and advising the client on its 
consequences.  
2 A “closing” is the final stage of a business transaction when the documents and agreements are signed (and, as 
appropriate, filed with requisite government agencies) and the transaction is then funded or otherwise effectuated. 
3 This article focuses on external, as opposed to in-house, transactional lawyers—that is, transactional lawyers 
within independent law firms. Although law firms continue to dominate sophisticated transactional work (see 
Appendix A, infra, at B.3, indicating that most clients seriously consider hiring law firms for transactions that are 
complex, unusual, or involve large dollar amounts), in-house legal departments in recent years have grown in 
reputation and skill. The value provided by in-house lawyers as transactional counsel, and the extent to which that 
value might be different from the value provided by external transactional lawyers, are possible issues for further 
study. Cf. Appendix A, infra, at B.1 (showing that transactional lawyers have a somewhat higher opinion than 
clients of the extent to which a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, perhaps indicating 
that general counsel with confidence in their own staff do not see as much of a need to hire high reputation firms for 
transactional work). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of In-House Transactional Lawyering (May 
17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).   
4 Cf. Ronald Gilson, 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 509 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998) 
(focusing on “lawyers providing non-litigation services to clients engaged in business activities”). Any value that 
transactional lawyers may provide as litigation counsel is beyond this article’s scope.  
5 The seminal work is Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE 
L. J. 239 (1984). See also Seminar, Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 et seq. 
(1995). 
6 See Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 242; Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business 
Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. 
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acknowledges
7—this represents the same types of value that could be added in business 
transactions by any sophisticated negotiating party, not necessarily one specially trained as a 
lawyer.
8 Investment bankers, for example, are key players in most business transactions who 
appear equally capable of identifying differences in valuation between parties, reducing 
transaction costs, acting as reputational intermediaries, anticipating (at least non-legal) risks and 
outcomes, and developing economies of scope.
9 Unless transactional lawyers add significant 
value in their capacity as lawyers, their utility would be questionable if not fungible. 
  This article challenges existing scholarship by attempting, empirically, to discover what 
value transactional lawyers actually provide. The empirical findings suggest that transactional 
lawyers create significant value in their capacity as lawyers in ways that have been 
underestimated by scholars and that may have profound significance to the future of the 




The article utilizes quantitative data to test a range of hypotheses about how transactional 
lawyers—focusing on lawyers in external law firms, as opposed to in-house lawyers
10—might 
provide value.
11 These data derive from the results of e-mail surveys with transactional lawyers 
and their clients.
12 The surveys were conducted using four-page questionnaires, one prepared for 
lawyers and a slightly modified version prepared for clients. The client questionnaires helped 
serve as a control, to help reveal any areas where lawyer perceptions of their value might not be 
shared by clients and thus might be inaccurate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 39 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and 
Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1995). 
7 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 295 (“There is nothing traditionally ‘legal’ about the 
role I have described business lawyers as playing, nor are there any special requirements peculiar to lawyers 
necessary to play this role.”). See also Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 
44–45 (1995) (proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational intermediaries). 
8 Though anticipating risks and outcomes is a uniquely lawyerly role to the extent it involves anticipating legal risks 
and outcomes.  
9 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 616–21 
(1984) (describing the role of the investment banker in distributing securities). 
10 See supra note 3. 
11 This focus on law firms means that the transactions at issue will tend to be those that are complex, unusual, or 
involve large dollar amounts. See supra note 3. See also infra note 14 (indicating the practice areas examined). 
12 Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (observing that empirical 
data “may be … the results of interviews or surveys”). 
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  The lawyer questionnaire included twenty-six questions, and the client questionnaire 
twenty-seven questions, in each case divided into sections based on the hypotheses discussed 
below.
13 Forms of these questionnaires are annexed as Addenda 1 (Lawyer Questionnaire) and 2 
(Client Questionnaire). The lawyer questionnaire was sent to a representative sampling of 
transactional lawyers,
14 and the client questionnaire was sent to a representative sampling of 
clients.
15 Approximately eight percent of these lawyers and four percent of these clients 
responded.
16  
  The hypotheses tested by these questionnaires are intended to represent all plausible 
hypotheses for how transactional lawyers might add value.
17 This article does not assume, 
however, that transactional lawyers in fact add value; it merely asks—if they do, how would that 
value be supplied? 
  This begs the questions: what constitutes value, and value to whom? By “value,” this 
article essentially means monetary value.
18 This would include not only lowering direct costs but 
also indirectly saving costs, such as reducing the time and effort that parties need to devote to a 
                                                 
13 See infra notes 34-55 and accompanying text. 
14 Lawyer questionnaires were sent to 500 lawyers in New York City, 211 lawyers in Philadelphia, and 270 lawyers 
in Chicago, cities selected to represent major and regional money centers in the United States. Respondents were 
selected randomly using a random number generator from a list of lawyers generated from the LexisNexis® 
Martindale-Hubbell® Lawyer Locator. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer 
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 107-11 (1994) (using a similar sampling 
method). To qualify to receive a survey, the lawyer must concentrate the majority of his or her practice in corporate 
transactional work (including mergers and acquisitions (M&A), securities law, corporate finance, project finance, or 
structured finance) and be a partner or counsel at a law firm with at least fifty lawyers that is listed in the NALP 
DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS. 
15 We initially e-mailed client questionnaires to the general counsel at 165 financial services or Fortune 500 
companies. Some additional responses also were obtained by e-mailing client questionnaires to former clients of the 
author and to Duke Law School alumni working at companies. The relevant text of the e-mail to which all 
questionnaires were attached is as follows: “[W]e have attached a short (4-page) questionnaire, which should take 
only a few minutes to complete. We would be grateful for your response or, if you prefer, the response of a 
colleague (or colleagues) in the legal department. The transactional areas on which we are focusing are securities 
offerings, M&A, commercial lending, and structured and project finance. / In addition, it would be especially useful 
to ascertain whether non-lawyers at your company have different perspectives on how law firms add value in 
business transactions. We therefore would appreciate your sharing the questionnaire with one or more of your non-
legal colleagues who work closely with outside counsel in the transactional areas mentioned above, and would be 
grateful for their responses.” 
16 There were 75 lawyer responses to 981 solicitations, and 17 client responses to 427 solicitations.  
17 See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text (setting forth these hypotheses and explaining their derivation).  
18 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 243 (arguing that if a transactional lawyer adds 
value, the transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer’s participation). Cf. RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (defining value as “human satisfaction as measured by 
aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services”). 
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business transaction.
19 Value also may include less tangible (and thus less quantifiable) factors, 
such as employing an experienced lawyer to increase client confidence and reduce anxiety.  
  As to the second question (value to whom?), the most obvious potential recipient of value 
is the client. For this reason, as well as to serve as a control,
20 the article also surveys clients of 
transactional lawyers. The article takes a broad societal perspective, however, and does not focus 
on value creation from the standpoint of any single client; even if a clever lawyer is able to 
negotiate a better deal for her client than a less clever lawyer is able to negotiate for his, that 
would not increase but would merely reallocate overall value in a zero-sum game.
21
  The foregoing methodology, of course, has potential flaws. Although they constitute “a 
primary source of data in . . .  the social sciences,”
22 surveys have inherent limitations, such as 
being dependent on the precise wording, format, and context of the survey questions.
23 Survey 
data also indicate, in this case, what transactional lawyers and their clients say the former do, 
which may be different from what transactional lawyers actually do. Transactional lawyers, for 
example, may view their roles as more important and indispensable than they actually are.
24  
  The low response rates to the questionnaires
25 also may signal potential biases, since 
“nonresponse often is not random.”
26 For example, the transactional lawyers who responded may 
have been more intellectually curious about this project than non-respondents; or those 
respondents may have been, on average, less busy—and therefore perhaps less competent 
lawyers—than non-respondents. Without denying the possibility of some such bias, the relatively 
small deviations in the lawyer-respondents’ answers and the high degree of correlation among 
city-by-city data mitigate somewhat against the existence of bias.
27 Moreover, transactional 
                                                 
19 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 254 (equating “cost-saving” with “value creation”). 
20 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
21 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 244-45. This article therefore does not examine the 
allocative role of transactional lawyers to try to get their clients the greatest slice of the value “pie.” 
22 Norbert Schwarz, Self Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGISt 93, 93 (Feb. 1999). 
23 Id. (observing that surveys are a “fallible source of data [in that] minor changes in question wording, question 
format, or question context can result in major changes in the obtained results”). 
24 See, e.g., Robert E. Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client Organizational Strategies 
Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 638 (2002) (“The self-
reports of elite actors, like lawyers, are especially suspect, for often they are speeches to an audience (other than the 
interviewer).”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Lawyers, Law and Contract Formation, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2748, 2749-50 
(2000) (discussing this tendency from the standpoint of lawyer self-reporting). 
25 See text accompanying note 16, supra, indicating approximate response rates of eight percent for lawyers and four 
percent for clients.  
26  See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE  MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 245 (2d ed. 2000) (Fed. Jud. Center). 
27 The uniformity of these data do not, of course, rule out the possibility that all respondents were similarly biased.   
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lawyers tend to be extremely busy, and the author’s expectations going into this project was that 
response rates would not exceed 10%—remarkably close to the actual response rate.
28  
  Because of these and other potential limitations,
29 this article attempts to explain and add 
perspective to the quantitative data by utilizing qualitative data in the form of “evidence about 
the world [of transactional lawyering] based on observation [and] experience.”
30 In part, these 
data derive from the author’s twenty-two years of observations and experiences as a transactional 
lawyer.
31 The use of qualitative data is as equally “empirical” as the use of quantitative data.
32
  The results of the survey data are consistent with these observations and experiences, 
indicating such data do indeed show what transactional lawyers actually do. This is not to say 
that these results are infallible, merely that—because a “truly empirical approach to measuring 
the impact of a business lawyer’s participation seems impossible”
33—survey results may be as 




In accordance with the foregoing methodology, this article tests the hypotheses that 
transactional lawyers add value by 1. minimizing the potential for ex post litigation; 2. reducing 
transaction costs; 3. reducing regulatory costs
34; 4. acting as reputational intermediaries; 5. 
providing client privilege and confidentiality; 6. creating economies of scope. These 
hypotheses—representing what appears to be the universe of plausible hypotheses for how 
                                                 
28 Although the client sampling was theoretically biased in that no attempt was made to distinguish clients who use 
lawyers for transactional work and clients who do not (indeed, all client respondents fell into the first category), any 
such bias should be minimal since the types of corporate transactional work this article examines (see supra note 14) 
almost always involves lawyers. 
29 Other potential limitations to this article’s methodology include that transactional lawyers were identified through 
the imprecise practice-area categories in Martindale-Hubbell (see supra note 14, listing those categories as M&A, 
securities law, corporate finance, project finance, and structured finance), and that law firms and clients were 
matched, based on these listings, using educated guesses.  
30 See Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 12, at 2 (observing that “empirical research, as natural and 
social scientists recognize, … denotes [not only quantitative data but also] evidence about the world based on 
observation or experience”). 
31 The author represented clients in transactions involving corporate finance, structured finance, and securities law 
from 1974 through 1989 as an associate and then partner at the law firm of Shearman & Sterling and from 1989 
through 1996 as partner and chairman of the Structured Finance Practice Group at the Kaye Scholer law firm.  
32 Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 12, at 2 (observing that “neither [quantitative nor qualitative 
observation about the world] is any more ‘empirical’ than the other”). 
33 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 247-48. 
34 In conversations with the author, Professor Victor Fleischer has referred to at least an aspect of this function of 
lawyers as “regulatory cost engineering.” 
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transactional lawyers might add value—were compiled from scholarly literature, practitioner 
literature, transactional lawyer feedback on draft questionnaires, and experience. None of these 
hypotheses is necessarily mutually exclusive of others. To the extent transactional lawyers add 
value, they might do so through a combination of these hypotheses.  
  Each of these hypotheses is further explained below.  
 1.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the potential for ex 
post litigation.  This hypothesis predicts that lawyers add value to transactions by anticipating 
and minimizing the likelihood that failure of the transaction will result in litigation.  
 2.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction costs.  
Under this hypothesis, transactional lawyers reduce certain transaction costs, thereby increasing 
the size of the pie for all parties.
35 They reduce moral hazard, for example, by drafting 
transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions due to changes in incentives. 
Thus, if the purchase price of a capital asset in an M&A transaction is adjusted based on buyer’s 
revenues in the year following the sale, the seller’s transactional lawyer could negotiate and draft 
the contract so as to eliminate the buyer’s incentive to increase current costs (and thereby adjust 
the purchase price downward).
36 This hypothesis also predicts that transactional lawyers reduce 
agency costs by implicitly monitoring (as independent advocates for their client’s position) that 
their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf,
37 and effectively reduce asymmetric information 
by giving legal opinions.
38
  Although complying with law might be broadly viewed as a cost of engaging in a 
transaction, the relevant literature does not generally include legal compliance as a transaction 
cost.
39 This article therefore discusses it as a separate hypothesis, below. 
 3.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs.  In 
its narrow form, this hypothesis predicts that transactional lawyers add value by understanding 
their clients’ regulatory concerns, thereby being able to negotiate deals without compromising 
                                                 
35 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 246. Professor Gilson refers to lawyers acting in this 
capacity as “transaction cost engineers.” Id. at 253-55. 
36 Id. at 255. 
37 Id. at _[cite]. 
38 Id. at 275, 291-92 (arguing that, in M&A transactions, transactional lawyers use their position as third-party 
intermediaries in a repeat-transactional world to give detached opinions on the state of the capital changing hands). 
39 See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.  
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regulatory compliance.
40 This “client-regulatory” legal work involves understanding the law and 
regulation that bind the client, qua client.    
  Because most clients, just like most companies, are not highly regulated (if regulated at 
all),
41 this article posits a broader hypothesis, distinguishing between client-regulatory legal work 
and “transaction-regulatory” legal work. Transaction-regulatory  legal work involves 
understanding the law and regulation that govern the particular type of transaction, irrespective 
of the regulatory concerns of the client engaging in the transaction. As an example of this 
distinction, consider a typical legal opinion, concluding (among other things) that an agreement 
is enforceable according to its terms and that performance thereof would not violate law.
42 In 
rendering this opinion, transactional counsel would be performing client-regulatory legal work to 
the extent counsel’s conclusion goes to no violation of law, and would be performing 
transaction-regulatory legal work to the extent the conclusion goes to enforceability of the 
agreement qua agreement.  
  Whereas literature to date examines only client-regulatory legal work, this article also 
examines transaction-regulatory legal work as a possible source of transactional lawyer value.  
 4.  The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational 
intermediaries.  Under this hypothesis, transactional lawyers, as repeat players in the 
transactional world, add value by renting their good reputation to clients. If, for example, a 
particular law firm is well known for representing underwriters selling securities, the hypothesis 
predicts that underwriter-clients, by using that firm, signal a measure of reliability and soundness 
to potential investors in those securities. The high-reputation law firm not only has expertise but, 
more importantly, bonds itself to good performance; it would lose at least part of its reputation if 
its fails to perform well.
43 In this regard, reputation appears to be a more effective “bond” than 
liability because professional negligence is hard to prove
44 and, where proved, is usually covered 
                                                 
40 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 4 (asserting that transactional lawyers 
“must play an important role in designing the structure of the transaction in order to assure the desired regulatory 
treatment”). 
41 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
42 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35-36 & 
55-56 (2005). See also infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing legal opinions). 
43 [In this context, query the functional relationship between high-reputation law firms and rating agencies, including 
barriers to entry, etc. cite] 
44 See, e.g., Krista M. Enns, Note, Can A California Litigant Prevail in an Action for Legal Malpractice Based on an 
Attorney’s Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme Court?, 48 DUKE L.J. 111, 146 (1998) (arguing that in 
legal malpractice actions “causation is so difficult to prove that litigants are likely to fail”); John H. Bauman, 
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by insurance.
45 The hypothesis also predicts that hiring a high-reputation law firm adds even 
greater value when the client does not already have a high reputation (e.g., is not a repeat player) 
in a type of transaction. 
  This hypothesis appears to be the most agreed upon scholarly theory of the value added 
by transactional lawyers.
46
 5.    The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by providing client privilege and 
confidentiality.  According to this hypothesis, lawyers add value by providing clients with a 
measure of privilege and confidentiality. Clients gain these protections through the attorney-
client privilege: a lawyer’s work product, including correspondence with clients in preparing for 
a deal, may be privileged under applicable state law.
47 Thus, a client may be able to 
communicate through its lawyers without revealing confidential matters to opposing parties.   
 6.    The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by creating economies of scope.  
Economies of scope represent the savings resulting from having the same investment support 
multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than separately.
48 Because 
transactional lawyers already play a legal role in transactions, this hypothesis predicts that 
“economies of scope should give them an advantage in performing the [non-legal] aspects of 
transaction structuring as well.”
49  
  According to this hypothesis, non-legal jobs include negotiation and drafting of deal 
documentation, identifying differences in valuation, reducing transaction costs, and engaging in 
due diligence. This hypothesis predicts, for example, that although a non-lawyer scrivener could 
instead negotiate and draft deal documentation, a lawyer would still be needed to review the 
documentation from a legal standpoint. Having the reviewing lawyer also do the negotiation and 
drafting creates the economy of scope. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Damages For Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal Of The Crumbling Dike And The Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1127, 1129 (1988). 
45 Although law firms presumably could make liability more of a “bond” by taking high insurance deductibles and 
advertising that to potential clients, one does not observe that in practice. [cite] 
46 See e.g., Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 6, at 46-48; Okamoto, 
Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, supra note 7, at 43.  
47 See Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633-49 (1997) (giving a state by state look at the corporate attorney-client privilege, 
and noting the uncertainty of the contours of the privilege in most states). 
48 C AMPBELL  R.  HARVEY,  HYPERTEXTUAL  FINANCE  GLOSSARY,  available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglose.htm (visited Nov. 23, 2005). 
49 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note  5, at 298. 
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  In examining this hypothesis, it is important to distinguish economies of scope from 
economies of scale. The latter represents the savings resulting from the greater efficiency of 
large-scale processes.
50 Transactional lawyers can and do create economies of scale, such as by 
counseling multiple transactions of a given type, thereby apportioning the cost of gaining 
experience and expertise. Although that adds value, it is not value that is unique to transactional 
lawyering: any party who advises on multiple transactions of a given type could add similar 
value. For that reason, and since economies of scale are not singled out in the literature as a 
source of transactional lawyer value, this article does not separately test whether transactional 
lawyers add value by creating economies of scale. To some extent, however, that value is 
implicit in certain of this article’s other hypotheses. For example, transactional lawyers should 
better perform transaction-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple transactions, should 
better perform client-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple clients subject to the same 
regulatory framework, and should be better reputational intermediaries by engaging in repeat 
transactions.    
  More marginal ways in which transactional lawyers may add value.  In addition to the 
foregoing hypotheses, transactional lawyers may add value in more marginal ways. From a 
behavioral-psychology standpoint, for example, transactional lawyers—by training if not also by 
the temperament of many who go into the legal profession, especially those who avoid being 
litigators—are likely to be more risk averse than their business clients.
51 These lawyers therefore 
may provide a sounding board to help clients balance risk-prone ideas. Transactional lawyers 
also might add value by enhancing the perception of social ordering: society has a fundamental 
need for order,
52 and lawyers are the priests who provide the order through law, granting 
confidence and authority to transactions.
53 Transactional lawyers additionally can add value to 
the client by providing a measure of risk-shifting, in that the client might have a claim against the 
                                                 
50 HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, supra note 48. 
51  See, e.g., Susan R. Helper, Symposium, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling 
Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 931 (2003) (arguing lawyers and economists are both very “risk 
averse”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting 
Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 375, 379 (1997) (predicting “systematic overstatement of risk is a robust, if 
not universal, phenomenon in the legal profession”). 
52 For example, the Noachide laws commanded mankind to establish courts of justice and a just social order. See 
Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b, translated in Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b (I. Epstein trans. & ed., 
1960); see also Rene David, Two Conceptions of Social Order, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 136, 140 (1983). 
53 [cite. Query whether the more reputable (expensive?) the lawyer, the greater the perceived confidence and 
authority?] 
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lawyer if the transaction results in losses. Any such claim would succeed, however, only if the 
lawyer was negligent in failing to protect against the losses, and clients should be able to insure 
more efficiently in other ways against bad outcomes.
54 Furthermore, this reallocation in overall 
value is not the type of value on which this article focuses.
55
  This article tests only the first six hypotheses. It does not systematically attempt to test 
the more marginal ways in which transactional lawyers might add value.
56  
 
4. Findings and Analysis
 
Set forth below are this article’s empirical findings. The data underlying these findings 
are presented in detail in Appendix A.
57 As the analysis shows, these findings contrast starkly in 
many cases with scholarly theory.   
 1.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing 
the potential for ex post litigation.  The findings partly support the first hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the potential for ex post litigation. Most lawyer-
respondents and client-respondents agree that this is one of the primary goals that lawyers 
drafting contracts should seek to accomplish.
58 Still, litigation is so rare that this role of lawyers 
might appear to add relatively modest value. On average, both lawyer-respondents and client-
respondents said that only about two percent of contracts actually end up in litigation.
59  
  Litigation may be rare, of course, precisely because transactional lawyers are effectively 
minimizing the potential for ex post litigation. Indeed, over three-quarters of the lawyer-
respondents and almost two-thirds of the client-respondents felt that contracts drafted by lawyers 
are much less likely to end up in litigation than contracts drafted by non-lawyers.
60 That 
explanation, however, is belied to some extent by the fact that what is litigated is often so 
                                                 
54 [cite] 
55 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
56 Thus, although the data in Appendix A hereto, at C.8, indicate that clients do not significantly look to 
transactional lawyers for third-party objectivity, such data do not systematically probe whether clients use such 
lawyers as sounding boards to help balance risk-prone ideas.  
57 Appendix A does not break down the data as among the categories of corporate transactional work (M&A, 
securities law, corporate finance, project finance, and structured finance) because the responses as among those 
categories were not statistically significant. See “Practice Area Data” memorandum from Casey Dwyer to the author 
(April 20, 2006) (on file with author).  
58 Appendix A, at A.1. 
59 See Appendix A, at A.2. 
60 Appendix A, at A.4. 
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different from what anyone negotiating the contract anticipated.
61 Almost half of all lawyer-
respondents, and two-thirds of client-respondents, said that none or at most only some
62 of the 
issues over which contracts were litigated were anticipated during negotiation.
63 Furthermore, 
none of the lawyer-respondents regarded “protecting [the] client from future litigation” as the 
sole primary goal of contracting.
64 Although most lawyer-respondents saw that protection as an 
important goal,
65 the only sole primary goal they identified was creating a roadmap for the 
parties to follow in their ongoing relationship.
66
  This suggests that the most valuable contracts might be those that straightforwardly 
describe the basic business understanding. Anecdotal evidence supports this view, suggesting 
that contracts may have less to do with avoiding litigation per se and more to do about setting 
forth a basic business understanding, and that money disputes often trigger litigation regardless 
of the contract terms.
67 Thus, although avoiding litigation is an important consideration, it may 
be more of a secondary consideration.
68  
  These findings call into question the oft-seen assumption of contract theory that lawyers 
add value to the contracting process primarily by minimizing the potential for ex post litigation.
69 
                                                 
61 One could argue, of course, that the fact that what is litigated is often so different from what anyone negotiating 
the contract anticipated just goes to show that, when lawyers anticipate issues, they are able to avoid litigation 
(although the reality is that there are always unanticipated issues, and these are mostly the issues that are litigated). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests this argument would be incomplete, however. See infra note 67 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that money disputes often trigger litigation regardless of the contract terms). 
62 By “some,” I mean between zero and forty percent. 
63 Appendix A, at A.3. These data were unusually “lumpy.” For example, when asked whether contracts are litigated 
over issues that were anticipated during negotiation, a quarter of the lawyer-respondents said that none of those 
issues were anticipated, approximately a quarter said that 41-60% of those issues were anticipated, while the 
remaining lawyer-respondents gave answers that appear randomly strewn in the other percentage categories. Id. This 
diverse range may well reflect that individual transactional lawyers see their limited experience as representative, 
extrapolating from inadequate data. One way to meaningfully interpret these data, however, may be to view them in 
the aggregate. From that perspective, approximately 43% of contracts on average are litigated over issues that were 
anticipated during negotiation. Id. 
64 Appendix A, at A.1. 
65 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
66 Appendix A, at A.1 (indicating that 9.3% of lawyer-respondents see this as their sole primary goal when drafting a 
contract). 
67 Comments of Stanley Star, Principal of Star Management Inc., to the author’s class, Principles of Commercial & 
Bankruptcy Law (Nov. 4, 2005). [add interviews -cite] 
68 Although 11.8% of the client-respondents did see protection from future litigation as the sole primary goal that 
lawyers drafting contracts should seek to accomplish (see Appendix A, at A.1), that disparity from the lawyer-
survey findings may reflect that clients hire lawyers for result oriented reasons, whereas lawyers view their role as 
more process oriented—in this case, to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in order to achieve, among other 
things, protection of the client from future litigation. 
69 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814 
(2006) (assuming this as the primary goal of contracting). See also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: 
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That in turn calls into question, at least in a business law context, contract-theory scholarship that 
is based on that assumption. In its place, the findings suggest the possibility of a modified 
paradigm for business law contracting: primarily to provide a roadmap for the parties to follow 
in their ongoing relationship, and secondarily to minimize the potential for ex post litigation. To 
some extent these goals are related, in that a clear roadmap minimizes the potential for litigation. 
Additionally, however, a clear roadmap not only documents the basic business understanding but 
also minimizes the potential for ex post disputes that do not rise to the level of litigation.  
  Minimizing the potential for ex post litigation, and arguably also the potential for non-
litigated disputes, so far has been viewed as a discrete hypothesis. Conceptually, however, it is 
more logically viewed (and in the remainder of this article will be discussed) as a subset of the 
next two hypotheses: reducing transaction costs and reducing regulatory costs. It is a subset of 
the former to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid business issues—and a subset of the 
latter to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid legal issues—that result in litigation and 
other disputes.  
 2.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing 
transaction costs.  The findings weakly support the second hypothesis, that transactional lawyers 
add value by reducing transaction costs (namely by reducing moral hazard by drafting 
transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions due to a change in incentives; 
by reducing agency costs by implicitly monitoring, as independent advocates for their client’s 
position, that their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf; and by effectively reducing 
asymmetric information by giving legal opinions
70).  
  Although most lawyers and clients felt that transactional counsel should be somewhat 
responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect the client against, possible future events that 
could change the client’s business incentives,
71 far fewer thought such counsel should be 
responsible for anticipating or drafting to protect the client against possible future events that 
could change the business incentives of other transaction parties.
72 Furthermore, relatively few 
                                                                                                                                                             
A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL  L.  REV. 1077 (2005) (generally addressing the 
lawyer’s role in contracts to minimize and prepare for future contingencies, including the potential for litigation). 
70 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
71 Appendix A, at E.2. 
72 Appendix A, at E.3. 
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lawyers and far fewer clients felt that transactional counsel monitor the client’s officers to any 
significant extent.
73
  Perhaps it is not surprising that transactional lawyers in fact add relatively little value in 
these ways. There is nothing per se “legal” about the role of transactional lawyers in reducing 
moral hazard; sophisticated non-lawyer scriveners also could anticipate moral hazard and draft to 
avoid it, such as by negotiating and drafting an M&A contract to eliminate a buyer’s incentive to 
increase current costs and thereby adjust a deferred purchase price downward.
74 Nor is there 
anything per se legal about the role of transactional lawyers in agency cost monitoring, a job that 
independent non-lawyers could likewise perform.
75 Indeed, Professor Gilson himself has 
recognized that non-lawyers
 could—and to some extent probably do—perform these functions as 
well as and at lower cost than lawyers.
76  
  The only example in the scholarly literature of transactional lawyers using their legal 
skills to reduce transaction costs is through giving legal opinions to reduce asymmetric 
information between transaction parties.
77 Legal opinions are: 
 
informed judgments, usually in writing, given by lawyers on issues of law. 
Although legal opinions are sometimes directed to clients, in a transactional 
setting legal opinions are often provided, at the request of clients, to or for the 
benefit of third parties such as financiers of credit or investors. . . . Third parties 
commonly require these opinions as a condition precedent to closing business 
transactions. The opinions provide some assurance that, at least insofar as those 
parties have requested opinion coverage . . . , nothing legally problematic lurks 
beneath the transaction’s surface. Lawyers providing the opinion apply 
applicable law to the transaction’s particular facts in order to reach their legal 
conclusions.  . . . [T]he inability of counsel to deliver a requested opinion at 
closing signals a problem and allows intended opinion recipients to refuse to 
consummate the transaction.
78   
 
                                                 
73 Appendix A, at E.4 (showing that only a third of lawyer-respondents monitor to a significant or greater extent that 
their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf, and that less than a fifth of client-respondents (6.3% ÷ 33.3%) 
perceive even that limited monitoring). [Query future effect of Sarbanes-Oxley “reporting up” -cite] 
74 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (using this example of moral hazard). 
75 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (showing that transactional lawyers do not perform this monitoring to 
any significant extent). 
76 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at __[cite]. But cf. infra notes 115-126 and 
accompanying text (discussing whether transactional lawyers could reduce these costs more efficiently than non-
lawyers due to economies of scope). 
77 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 312. 
78 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 42, at 9-14 (emphasis added).  
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  The survey findings suggest, however, that opinion-giving by transactional lawyers is 
relatively insignificant. Only a small fraction—five to fifteen percent—of a transactional 
lawyer’s work is involved with issuing legal opinions.
79 Moreover, opinion-giving fits uneasily 
into the second hypothesis. The argument for its fit is that it reduces transaction costs by 
reducing information asymmetry.
80 But it can be misleading to say that legal opinions reduce 
information asymmetry since “recipients of [legal] opinions often have the same factual 
information that opining counsel has.”
81 Legal opinions actually work in a more limited sense—
by applying applicable law to those facts in order to reach legal conclusions
82—and even then 
the “[r]ecipient’s counsel is likely to have the same ability to apply the law to facts as opining 
counsel.”
83  
Opinion-giving does, however, fit more naturally into the next hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs—by assessing the legal 
consequences of the transaction for the parties receiving the opinion.
84
 3.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing 
regulatory costs.  The findings strongly support the third hypothesis, that transactional lawyers 
add value by reducing regulatory costs.
85 Over ninety-three percent of transactional lawyers said 
their transactional work involves law to a “significant” or “great” extent.
86 Although that 
percentage may to some extent reflect a self-reporting bias,
87 the equivalent figure for client 
respondents was almost as high.
88 These findings differ significantly from the predictions of 
existing theoretical literature.  
  To appreciate how transactional lawyers add value under this hypothesis, this article 
distinguishes between client-regulatory legal work and transaction-regulatory legal work.
89 
                                                 
79 Appendix A, at E.1. 
80 See supra note 77. 
81 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 42, at 10 n.54. 
82 Id. at 10-11. 
83 Jonathan Macey, The Limits of Legal Analysis: Using Externalities to Explain Legal Opinions in Structured 
Finance,  84 TEX. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005). 
84 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 42, at 11 n. 54. 
85 See Appendix A, at F.1 (indicating that the work of transactional lawyers involves law to a significant extent).  
86 Id. 
87 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 2749-50 (observing that “law is 
the province of lawyers, and thus, lawyers will be more likely to perceive an important role for law in any given 
transaction than would nonlawyers”).  
88 Appendix A, at F.1 (showing that 76.5% percent of clients said their lawyer’s transactional work involves law to a 
“significant” or “great” extent).  
89 See supra note 40 and following text. 
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Although transactional counsel can add value by performing client-regulatory legal work, there 
are two important limitations on that value. The first is that many companies that engage in 
transactions—and therefore many clients of transactional lawyers—are not regulated entities.
90 
The legal work performed by those transactional lawyers would not be client-regulatory.  
  The second limitation is that, even where their clients are regulated entities, transactional 
lawyers do not always need to get deeply involved with the regulation. Even when regulation is 
central to a transaction, the findings show that transactional lawyers do not always feel a need to 
understand their clients’ regulatory concerns in detail.
91 The majority of transactional lawyers 
understand those concerns only to the extent needed to know when to alert regulatory counsel—
typically in-house counsel of the client
92—to the possibility of legal issues.
93  
  Experience confirms this second limitation. Transactional lawyers representing a bank, 
for example, need only become sufficiently familiar with the federal margin regulations
94 to 
know when to alert regulatory counsel that there may be a compliance issue.
95 Transactional 
counsel also are not “typically requested [to opine] on issues whose analysis would be 
independent of the transaction’s fact pattern.”
96 This interplay of transactional and regulatory 
counsel may well have evolved because the complexities of modern regulation can make it 
impractical for a lawyer to gain and maintain expertise in both regulation of a client and 
regulation of transactions engaged in by the client. 
                                                 
90 Although 59% of the client-respondents reported that their business was significantly more highly regulated than 
“ordinary” business corporations (see Appendix A, at F.2), that relatively high indication of regulation may reflect 
only that more heavily regulated companies responded disproportionately to the survey. 
91 Only about a third of the lawyer-respondents felt the need to understand their clients’ regulatory concerns in 
detail. Appendix A, at F.3. Although almost half of the client-respondents felt that their transactional lawyers did 
need such a detailed understanding, that apparent discrepancy simply may reflect that 58.8% of the client survey 
data were from businesses—whereas only 28.7% of the lawyer-respondent data related to clients—that said they 
were “significantly” or “greatly” more highly regulated than “ordinary” business corporations. See Appendix A, at 
F.2. Breaking down the data shows a strong correlation between the degree of client regulation and the extent to 
which clients want their lawyers to understand their regulatory concerns in more detail. [cite and explain data 
breakdown]  
92  The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 42, at 51 (observing that many in-house legal staffs have attorneys 
specifically dedicated to compliance with law). See also id. at 35-36 (observing that in-house counsel typical give 
no-violation-of-law opinions). Regulatory counsel also can be colleagues of the transactional lawyers or lawyers at 
other firms. 
93 Appendix A, at F.3.  
94 Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (restricting certain bank loans used to purchase or refinance the purchase of margin 
stock). 
95 Such a compliance issue would arise, for example, where the bank makes a loan secured by margin stock, 
especially where that loan is used to purchase or refinance the purchase of margin stock. Noncompliance with 
Regulation U would render the loan void. Stonehill v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 68 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
96 The Limits of Lawyering, supra note 42, at 11 n. 53. For an efficiency explanation of which transactional counsel 
is better situated to provide legal opinions, see Macey, The Limits of Legal Analysis, supra note 83, at 76-78. 
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  Consistent with those limitations, the findings suggest that transactional counsel reduce 
regulatory costs, and thus add value, primarily by performing transaction-regulatory legal work: 
by providing expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern the transaction and by 
understanding the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction documents.
97 This 
expertise can include, for example, ensuring that desired legal priorities are achieved, and that 
security interests are properly perfected and subordination agreements are enforceable; that 
indenture covenants are not violated, and that covenant protections adequately balance debtor 
and creditor needs; that commercial-law remedies to made available upon insolvency or default 
work in harmony with debtor-creditor law protections; that legal entities are established in the 
form (e.g., corporation, trust, partnership, limited liability company) and with the governance 
characteristics most effective for the task, given such competing constraints as the tradeoff 
between equity-holder and creditor rights, bankruptcy law, tax law, and accounting; that 
guaranties and other credit supports are legally enforceable; that any special-purpose entities 
achieve the applicable legal requirements of rating agencies and investors, such as “true sale,” 
“non-consolidation,” and other “bankruptcy remoteness” criteria; that cross-border legal 
demands are complied with; and that any securities law requirements are met.
98 These findings 
conflict with scholarly conclusions that transactional lawyers primarily add the same types of 
value that could be added in business transactions by any sophisticated negotiating party, not 
necessarily one specially trained as a lawyer.
99   
 4.  Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by acting as 
reputational intermediaries.  The findings weakly support the fourth hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational intermediaries.
100 One of the main 
claims of this hypothesis—that much greater trust should be given to non-legal information 
where the party giving that information (e.g., a company being acquired in an M&A transaction) 
is represented by a reputable law firm
101—was almost unanimously rejected by transactional 
                                                 
97 Appendix A, at F.4. 
98 [cite to experience and targeted interviews.] 
99 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
100 [Consider comparing this hypothesis with Professor Gordon’s “noble lawyer” proposal, Robert W. Gordon, A 
New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003). cite] 
101 See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 288-93 (describing the central role of 
transactional lawyers as reputational intermediaries paid to verify the seller-client’s information for the buyer). This 
article’s survey did not specifically test a weaker form of this claim, that transactional lawyers add value as 
reputational intermediaries in certain securities offerings by delivering a limited “negative assurance” legal opinion 
as to absence of knowledge of potential securities-law disclosure violations under SEC Rule 10b-5. See Gilson, 
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lawyers and clients alike.
102 This rejection is particularly significant because this hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational intermediaries, is the most agreed upon 
scholarly theory.
103
  To some extent, these findings should not be surprising. Aside from the incongruity of 
lawyers—who, after all, do not have the highest public trust—acting as proxies for 
trustworthiness, the value of a law firm as a reputational intermediary would be expected to be 
proportional to the need for trustworthiness and credibility. In simple or routine transactions, that 
need may be small, whereas the cost of hiring a high-reputation law firm may be expensive.  
  Furthermore, even in complex or unusual transactions involving large amounts of money, 
the need for trustworthiness and credibility often concerns financial, not legal, information. To 
this end, accountants, and not lawyers, are held responsible for certifying the accuracy of that 
information.
104  
  The findings additionally reveal other limitations to the reputational intermediary 
hypothesis. Contrary to theory, reputational value per se is less important than the quality and 
experience provided by high reputation transactional counsel, who add value primarily by 
performing better legal work. Thus, one-hundred percent of client-respondents and almost 
ninety-nine percent of lawyer-respondents cited experience as the most important reason that law 
firms contribute to the success of a transaction.
105 Reputation value by itself was a secondary 
                                                                                                                                                             
Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 291-93 (using the perspective of transactional-lawyer-as-
reputational-intermediary to help explain the existence of these opinions). I have no doubt these opinions add some 
value, but they effectively address legal conclusions and therefore fall within this article’s discussion of legal 
opinions generally. See supra notes 77-84, 42 and accompanying text. In any event, these opinions are appropriate in 
only very narrow circumstances. Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions of the ABA Section 
of Business Law, Negative Assurances in Securities Offerings, 59 BUS. LAW. 1513 (2004).     
102 Appendix A, at B.5 (68.0% of lawyer-respondents and 82.4% of client-respondents said that non-legal 
information should not be trusted any more simply because the party giving that information is represented by a 
reputable law firm). Only 30.7% of lawyers and 17.7% of clients felt that information should be trusted even 
“somewhat” more, and only one respondent (a lawyer) felt that information should be trusted “much” more). Id. 
103 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. But cf. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, supra note 7, 
at 42-43 (suggesting that the lawyer’s role as reputational intermediary is declining over time). [Consider increasing 
LLP organization of law firms as possible corroboration. Cite] 
104 Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31  J.  CORP.  L. issue no. 4 
(forthcoming Sept 2006) (examining the boundary between lawyer and accountant responsibility for financial 
information). Even negative assurance legal opinions (discussed supra note 101) commonly exclude legal 
conclusions based on financial information. E-mail from William Widen, Associate Professor, University of Miami 
School of Law, & former Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to the author (July 21, 2005) (observing that “it was 
quite common, in [his] experience, for lawyers to exclude financial statement information from the scope of the 
negative assurance given to underwriters in a 10b-5 [negative assurance opinion] letter”). 
105 Appendix A, at B.2. 
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consideration, along with the law firm having smart lawyers.
106 One lawyer’s comment typifies 
the responses: “Skill not reputation is the key. Most lawyers don’t care about ‘firm name,’ but 
can quickly assess competence.”
107  
  Reputation also can create costs that offset value. For example, to the extent a party to a 
transaction hires a high-reputation law firm, another party may feel “outgunned” and thus hire its 
own high-reputation law firm, resulting in a “dollar auction” arms race. These costs could be 
substantial; approximately forty-three percent of client respondents said they would consider 
hiring a highly-reputed law firm simply because the opposing party did so.
108
 5.    Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by providing 
client privilege and confidentiality.  The findings are mixed regarding the fifth hypothesis, that 
transactional lawyers add value by providing client privilege and confidentiality. While forty-
four percent of client-respondents said the attorney-client privilege provided significant value 
and twenty-five percent even said it provided great value,
109 most respondents said that this 
privilege did not significantly facilitate transactions or, if it did facilitate transactions, that it did 
so only to a small degree.
110  
  These results can perhaps be explained by the perspective of respondents to the 
questionnaire: from the standpoint of any given client, this privilege can be valuable. It is less 
clear, however, that the privilege creates net overall value, which this article views from a broad 
societal perspective (and not from the standpoint of any single client).
111  
  Even if this hypothesis accounted for a portion of transactional lawyer value, that portion 
may well fluctuate over time. Privileges and confidentiality are somewhat artificial,
112 and there 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Cf. Timothy Hia, Note, Que Sera, Sera? The Future of Specialization in Large Law Firms, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 541, 560 (2002) (observing that training and specialization of lawyers within law firms is increasingly 
important to enhancement of reputational value in specific practice areas). To this extent, reputational value may be 
self-enhancing, in that high-reputation firms are more likely to train their lawyers well in order to enhance the 
quality of their work and thus preserve the reputation. 
108 Appendix A, at B.3. [Consider in context of possible in-optimal Nash equilibriums. cite] 
109 Appendix A, at D.1.  
110 Appendix A, at D.2. 
111 Cf. text accompanying note 21, supra (viewing “value” from a broad societal perspective, not from the standpoint 
of any single client). 
112 The attorney-client privilege first developed under Roman law, but was not well-entrenched in modern law until 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth 1, when it was viewed as a means of protecting an attorney’s honor as a gentleman. 
Ken M. Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work-Product 
Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2001). 
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appears to be a trend, at least in the corporate context, to narrow the attorney-client privilege.
113 
States also could, if they wished, create similar privileges for non-lawyer advisers.
114 This article 
therefore does not attach much significance to this fifth hypothesis.  
 6.    Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by creating 
economies of scope.  The findings only weakly support the sixth hypothesis, that transactional 
lawyers add value through economies of scope. Recall that this hypothesis predicts that 
transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform non-legal transactional work, such as 
negotiating and drafting deal documentation,
115 because they already are involved in performing 
the legal work. A majority of both lawyer and client respondents indeed agreed that, at least to 
some extent, transactional lawyers perform non-legal work because someone must do so and 
transactional lawyers are already involved.
116 Almost half of the lawyer-respondents also felt that 
such non-legal work is, to a significant extent, necessarily incident to their legal tasks.
117 In 
contrast, though, most client-respondents felt that non-legal work performed by transactional 
lawyers is only to some extent if at all necessarily incident to those lawyers’ legal tasks.
118
  More problematically for the economy-of-scope hypothesis, the findings call into 
question its hallmark—that transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform the non-legal 
transactional work. Almost two-thirds of client-respondents indicated that the non-legal work 
performed by transactional lawyers could be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers.
119 The 
findings also show that transactional lawyers usually charge at their full rate when performing 
non-legal work,
120 so clients pay dearly for it.
121
                                                 
113  See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 69 NOTRE  DAME  L.  REV. 157, 159 (1993) (arguing that traditional rationales for the attorney-client 
privilege do not hold in the corporate context, and that the corporate attorney-client privilege should be abolished). 
See also Thomas Ross, Knowing No Other Duty: Privity, The Myth of Elitism, and the Transformation of the Legal 
Profession, 32 WAKE  FOREST  L.  REV. 819, 827 (1997) (observing the extent to which state legislatures are 
narrowing the attorney-client privilege). 
114 Similar privileges already exist, for example, for communications between individuals and physicians, 
clergymen, and therapists. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998). 
115 See supra note 49 and following text. 
116 Appendix A, at C.3. 
117 Appendix A, at C.4. 
118 Id. 
119 Appendix A, at C.6. To some extent, this view may reflect the rate charged by transactional lawyers, next 
discussed, when performing non-legal work.  
120 Appendix A, at C.5 (84.6% of client-respondents said that their transactional lawyers charged full rates for non-
legal work). 
121 Cf. Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, supra note 104 (showing in another context that 
economy of scope alone would not justify extending lawyer responsibility to non-legal matters—namely, that 
lawyers advising a public firm should not be charged with responsibility as independent gatekeepers vis-à-vis the 
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  It therefore behooves lawyers, for their integrity if not also to attempt to achieve a true 
economy of scope (and, more self-interestedly, to preserve this franchise
122), to perform this 
work as efficiently as feasible. To this end, law schools should consider emphasizing writing and 
contract-drafting and negotiating skills, which business schools (at least regarding writing and 
drafting) do not presently emphasize.
123 
  This recognizes that economies of scope exist only where the same investment supports 
multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than separately.
124 Utilizing 
transactional lawyers to negotiate and draft contracts merely because they already are involved in 
examining regulatory aspects of the transaction does not ensure that each additional activity will 
be performed profitably, or as profitably as such activity would be performed by other parties. 
The negotiating and contracting process itself can create, or destroy, value—the former being 
exemplified by the creation of personal relationships that help build business relationships 
between opposing parties and the consensus problem-solving that helps facilitate closing the 
business transaction to all parties’ satisfaction.
125 Where transactional lawyers do not facilitate 
those interpersonal and problem-solving goals, they may well destroy the value that an economy 
of scope could achieve—the ultimate manifestation of which is a lawyer who, by obstinacy or 
otherwise, causes a valuable transaction to fail.
126 This suggests that law schools additionally 
should consider stressing consensus problem-solving and the importance of interpersonal 
relationships. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm’s accountants because, even where such lawyers are already involved in advising the firm (and thus would 
achieve an economy of scope by acting as accounting gatekeepers), the cost of imposing this additional 
responsibility would exceed its benefits). 
122 Although the findings do not reveal the precise size of this franchise, more than two-thirds of client-respondents 
believe that the work of transactional lawyers can be performed at least to some extent by a non-lawyer. Appendix 
A, at C.1. 
123 See Leslie L. Cooney & Lynn A. Epstein, Classroom Associates: Creating a Skills Incubation Process for 
Tomorrow’s Lawyer, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 364-372 (2001). 
124 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (defining economies of scope). 
125 One client-questionnaire respondent, for example, observed that an important goal of contracting is to “help build 
our business relationship with the other party.” Survey Response on file with author. See also The World: China—
“One Billion Customers” (PBS, WUNC FM, radio broadcast Nov. 21, 2005) (interview by Lisa Mullins with James 
McGregor, author of  ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS—LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA and 
former China bureau chief, WALL STREET JOURNAL): “In China, you negotiate a contract but that piece of paper in 
the ends means nothing. But the process of negotiating and the personal relationships you build while negotiating 
that contract and the problem solving methods you work out together in doing that, those are the things that are 
going to make the business go ahead and hold on.” This observation appears true in the U.S. as well.
126 In this regard, it is noteworthy that whereas most lawyer-respondents felt they actively try to facilitate good 




This article’s findings show that transactional lawyers add value, or at least say that they 
add value, primarily by reducing regulatory costs. Of the two types of regulatory costs—client-
regulatory and transaction-regulatory
127—transactional lawyers normally focus on the latter. This 
may help explain why they usually concentrate in such transaction-regulatory intensive areas as 
securities law, M&A, bank lending, structured finance, and project finance.
128  
  These findings also present a very different picture of how business lawyers add value 
than that portrayed by existing scholarship, challenging the reigning models of transactional 
lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational intermediaries.” Under those models, 
transactional lawyer value “rests neither on [the] inherently legal character [of transactional 
lawyer work] nor … on skills acquired through traditional legal training.”
129 As a result, scholars 
have predicted a bleak possible vision of the future, in which “the [legal] profession’s 
transactional role is reduced from engineer to draftsman, at the expense of lawyers’ prosperity 
and the intellectual interest of their work”
130 due to competition with other professions, such as 
investment bankers and accountants.
131  
  That vision, however, appears flawed. If transactional lawyers provide most of their value 
through their expertise in law, they are unlikely to face competition with, much less to be 
replaced by, non-legal professionals. Indeed, fewer than two percent of lawyer-respondents and 
fewer than twelve percent of client-respondents felt that transactional lawyer work could be 
performed by non-lawyers to any significant extent.
132 To the extent law and regulation become 
more pervasive in the future, transactional lawyers will become even more uniquely valuable. 
Contrary to academic claims, transactional lawyers are (and should be) secure in their 
professions.  
                                                 
127 For an explanation of the differences between these costs, see supra notes 41 & 84-42 and accompanying text. 
128 [cite to law firm websites, and show why there is no circularity with the proxies used to identify transactional 
lawyers] Indeed, unregulated companies that engage in routine unregulated transactions often do not hire outside 
transactional counsel, and sometimes might not use counsel at all. [cite]  
129 Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 301 (commenting in the context of the transaction 
cost engineer model). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Appendix A, at C.1. Athough “some” work performed by transactional lawyers might be performed more 
efficiently by non-lawyers (compare Appendix A, at C.1, with Appendix A, at C.6), most such work could not 
because transactional lawyers add most of their value by reducing regulatory costs. 
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  This article’s findings also suggest flaws in the existing scholarly visions of how legal 
education should change. Based on existing models, scholars have argued for an increased focus 
on finance theory and transaction-cost economics.
133 Some even claim that teaching these 
economic subjects in lieu of the case method will help law students to develop judgment.
134 
Although, as a professor of law and business, I regard finance theory and transaction-cost 
economics as important, the findings suggest that budding transactional lawyers would be even 
better served by focusing on law and on applying legal concepts to solve real-world problems—
goals that the case method has a long and distinguished record of helping students to achieve.
135 
Similarly, law schools should introduce, if not emphasize, the importance of developing good 
working relationships between opposing lawyers in business transactions.
136 Perhaps Dean 
Kronman has been right, after all, in emphasizing the importance of traditional case analysis over 
theory and social sciences.
137
  This article does not claim, however, that its findings are dispositive of these issues. As 
discussed, its use of survey methodology has inherent limitations.
138 The article nonetheless is a 
first empirical step in engaging the debate over these issues. 
 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 5, at 304-05; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 6, 
at 3-14. 
134  See  Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 6, at 6-7 (arguing that teaching such disciplines as “[t]ransaction cost 
economics” and “the economics of information” will more effectively “send out from law school more students with 
judgment than just those who arrived already possessing it.”).  
135 This does not imply that finance and economic theory should be ignored; the question is one of balance. Cf. 
Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEG. ED. 342, 351 (2005) (arguing that “[m]odern 
finance [has] become the language of business, and lawyers need[] to be knowledgeable about it in order to serve 
their clients”). See also id. at 352 (discussing the “need for technical proficiency” in finance and economics on the 
part of business lawyers). 
136 [In this context, consider what B-schools do. cite] 
137  Cf.  ANTHONY  KRONMAN,  THE  LOST  LAWYER:  FAILING  IDEALS OF THE LEGAL  PROFESSION 225-64 (1993) 
(maintaining this emphasis) with Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that teaching the disciplines 
referred to supra note 134 “will do a far better job [of training transactional lawyers] than the case method purveyors 
of Dean Kronman’s golden age could ever have imagined”).  
138 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. 
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Addendum 1: Form of Lawyer Questionnaire 
 











Area(s) of Practice: 
 
Years of Legal Experience: 
 
 
N NO OT TI IC CE E: :  T Th hi is s   q qu ue es st ti io on nn na ai ir re e’ ’s s   p pu ur rp po os se e   i is s   t to o   h he el lp p   u un nd de er rs st ta an nd d   t th he e   v va al lu ue e   a ad dd de ed d   b by y   o ou ut ts si id de e   
c co ou un ns se el l    i in n    t th he e    n ne eg go ot ti ia at ti in ng g    a an nd d    c co on nt tr ra ac ct ti in ng g    p pr ro oc ce es ss s    l le ea ad di in ng g    t to o    c cl lo os si in ng g    a a    c co om mm me er rc ci ia al l, ,   
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l, ,   o or r   o ot th he er r   b bu us si in ne es ss s   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on n. .   P Pl le ea as se e   a as ss su um me e   t th ha at t   a al ll l   q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   b be el lo ow w   p pe er rt ta ai in n   t to o   
t th ho os se e   t ty yp pe es s   o of f   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s. .  
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
 
1.  When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?: (a) __ setting forth a 
roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship; (b) __ protecting your client from 






2.  Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in litigation 
(please specify percentage)?:  ___% 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues that were 
anticipated during negotiation?: ___% 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future litigation 
than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __ somewhat less 






B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a 
transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ 
to a small extent or not at all.   
 
2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do so 
(check all that apply)?:  (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of transaction; (b) __ 
such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to potential investors. 
 
3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that apply):  (a) 
__ in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving large dollar 
amounts; (c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential investors put a premium on 
trustworthiness and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions where opposing parties hire highly 
reputed law firms.   
 
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):  (a) __ are 
as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b) __ are 
sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased against innovating 
changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating changes in the transactions.  
 
5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information provided by 
another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, as opposed to where 
that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:  (a) __ should trust that information much 




C. Creating Economies of Scope 
 
1.  To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at 
all.    
 





3.  To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must, and you 
already are involved in the transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; 
(c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
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4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at 
all. 
 
5.  Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
7.  When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good 
relationships with opposing counsel?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) 
__ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at 
all. 
 
2.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:  (a) __ to a great 
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all; 
(e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating transactions (for example, by 
increasing information asymmetry among transaction parties). 
 
 
E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
 
1.  What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or reviewing 
legal opinions?:  ___ %.  
 
2.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client against, 
possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?:  (a) __ to a great 
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
3.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client against, 
possible future events that could change the business incentives of other transaction parties?:  
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:  (a) __ to 
a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not 






F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?:  (a) __ to a great 
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent.  
 
2.  To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government than an 
ordinary business corporation?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a 
small extent; (d) __ not at all. 
 
3.  When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what extent 
do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory concerns?:  (a) __ in 
detail; (b) __  only sufficiently to know when to alert regulatory counsel to the possibility of 
legal issues; (c) __ other [please describe: ___________ 
___________________________________________________________________]. 
 
4.  When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which of the 
following statements are true (mark all that are true)?:  (a) __ you need to provide expertise in 
the law and regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __  you need to 
understand the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction documents; (c) __ other 






Addendum 2: Form of Client Questionnaire 
 
 











Area(s) of Responsibility: 
 
Years of Experience: 
 
   
N NO OT TI IC CE E: :      T Th hi is s   q qu ue es st ti io on nn na ai ir re e’ ’s s   p pu ur rp po os se e   i is s   t to o   h he el lp p   u un nd de er rs st ta an nd d   t th he e   v va al lu ue e   a ad dd de ed d   b by y   o ou ut ts si id de e   
c co ou un ns se el l    i in n    t th he e    n ne eg go ot ti ia at ti in ng g    a an nd d    c co on nt tr ra ac ct ti in ng g    p pr ro oc ce es ss s    l le ea ad di in ng g    t to o    c cl lo os si in ng g    a a    c co om mm me er rc ci ia al l, ,   
f fi in na an nc ci ia al l, ,   o or r   o ot th he er r   b bu us si in ne es ss s   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on n. .   P Pl le ea as se e   a as ss su um me e   t th ha at t   a al ll l   q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   b be el lo ow w   p pe er rt ta ai in n   t to o   
t th ho os se e   t ty yp pe es s   o of f   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s. .    
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
 
1.  When you hire lawyers to draft a contract, what do you want them to primarily accomplish?: 
(a) __ to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship; (b) __ to 






2.  Approximately what percentage of your contracts eventually end up in litigation (please 
specify percentage)?:  ___% 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues that were 
anticipated during negotiation?: ___% 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future litigation 
than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __ somewhat less 





B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does hiring a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a 
transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ 
to a small extent or not at all.   
 
2. If hiring a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do 
so (check all that apply)?:  (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of transaction; (b) __ 
such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to potential investors. 
 
3. One should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that apply):  (a) __ 
in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving large dollar amounts; 
(c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a premium on trustworthiness and 
credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential investors put a premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions where opposing parties hire highly reputed law firms.   
 
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):  (a) __ are 
as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b) __ are 
sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased against innovating 
changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating changes in the transactions.  
 
5. To what extent, if any, do you trust non-legal information provided by another transaction 
party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, as opposed to where that party is 
represented only by in-house counsel?:  (a) __ trust that information much more; (b) __ trust that 
information somewhat more; (c) __ no greater trust in that information. 
 
C. Creating Economies of Scope
 
1.  To what extent could your lawyer’s work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:  
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all.    
 





3.  To what extent does your lawyer perform that non-legal work simply because someone must, 
and your lawyer already is involved in the transaction?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a 
significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your lawyer’s legal tasks?:  (a) 
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent 
or not at all. 
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5.  Does your lawyer charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:  __ Yes;  __ No. 
 
7.  To what extent does involving your lawyer in that non-legal work add value by providing 
third-party objectivity?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some 
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all. 
 
8.  To what extent do you want your lawyer, when negotiating a transaction, to facilitate good 
relationships with opposing counsel?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) 
__ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you value the protection provided by the attorney-client privilege?:  (a) __ 
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or 
not at all. 
 
2.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:  (a) __ to a great 
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all; 
(e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating transactions (for example, by 
increasing information asymmetry among transaction parties). 
 
 
E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
 
1.  What percentage of your lawyer’s work on a transaction involves preparing and issuing legal 
opinions?:  ___ %.  
 
2.  To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you against, 
possible future events that could change your business incentives?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) 
__ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.  
 
3.  To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you against, 
possible future events that could change the business incentives of other transaction parties?:  
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small 
extent or not at all. 
 
4.  To what extent does your lawyer monitor that your company’s officers act on the company’s 
behalf?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a 





F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your lawyer’s work on a transaction actually involve law?:  (a) __ to a 
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent. 
 
2.  To what extent is your company more regulated by government than an ordinary business 
corporation?:  (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent; (d) 
__ not at all. 
 
3.  When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, to what extent should they 
need to understand the details of your company’s particular regulatory concerns?:  (a) __ in 
detail; (b) __  only sufficiently to know when to alert your company’s regulatory counsel to the 
possibility of legal issues. 
 
4.  When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, which of the following 
statements are true (mark all that are true)?:  (a) __ they should provide expertise in the law and 
regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __  they should understand the 
rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction documents. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE DATA UNDERLYING THIS ARTICLE’S 
FINDINGS 
 
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
 
1.  When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?:  
 
 Lawyers 












(a) Setting forth a roadmap 
for the parties to follow in 
their ongoing relationship 
9.3 %  3.6 %  3.7 %  25.0%  0.0 % 
(b) protecting your client 
from future litigation  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0%  11.8 % 
(c) both of the above  84.0 %  89.3 %  92.6 %  65.0 %  88.2 % 
(d) other   32.0 %  35.7 %  37.0 %  20.0 %  11.8 % 
  
 
2.  Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in litigation 
(please specify percentage)?:  ___%   
 











Average  2.06 %  1.65 %  2.26 %  2.33 %  1.24 % 
Median  1.0 %  1.0 %  1.0 %  1.0 %  1.0 % 
Standard Deviation  3.33  2.64  3.16  4.37  2.36 
 
 
3.  Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues that were 
anticipated during negotiation?:   
 












0  25.5 %  31.6%  23.5 %  21.1 %  50.0% 
1-20  10.9 %  0.0 %  11.8%  21.1 %  16.7% 
21-40  7.3 %  5.3 %  11.8 %  5.3 %  0.0% 
41-60  27.3 %  36.8 %  17.6 %  26.3 %  33.3% 
                                                 
139 The wording of the client question and possible answers varied slightly. See Addendum 2 (Form of Client 
Questionnaire).      
140 The low response rate to this question stems from the fact that most who answered zero to Question A.2 found 
this question non-applicable.   
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61-80  9.1 %  10.5 %  11.8 %  10.5 %  0.0% 
81-99  3.6 %  0.0 %  11.8 %  0.0 %  0.0% 
100  16.4 %  15.8 %  17.6 %  15.8 %  0.0% 
Average  43.71 %  43.95 %  47.41 %  40.16 %  17.17 %
Median   50 %  50 %   50 %  50 %  0.50 % 
Standard Deviation  36.92   36.31    40.01   36.36  24.30  
 
 
4.  To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future litigation 
than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: 
   
 Lawyers 











 (a) Much less likely  80.6 %  84.6 %   76.9 %  80.0 %   64.3 % 
 (b) Somewhat less likely   9.7 %   3.9 %   11.5 %   15.0 %   28.6 % 
 (c) Not less likely    0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0  %   0.0 %   0.0 % 
 (d) Uncertain    11.1 %  11.5 %  15.4  %  5.0 %  7.1% 
 
 
B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries 
 
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a 
transaction?:   
 
 Lawyers 











 (a) To a great extent    47.3 % 46.4 %     51.9 %  42.1 %    25.0 %  
 (b) To a significant extent    41.9 %  42.9 %    33.3 %  52.6 %     37.5 %  
 (c) To some extent  10.8 %   10.7 %   14.8 %   5.3 %  18.8 % 
 (d) To a small extent or not 
at all     1.4 %   0.0 %   0.0 %  5.3 %     18.8 % 
 
 
2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do so 
(check all that apply)?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) Such law firm is 
experienced in the type of   98.7 %  100.0  %     96.3 %    100.0 %   100.0%  
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transaction 
(b) Such law firm has smart 
lawyers   73.3 %   75.0 %      66.7 %   80.0 %    57.1 %  
(c) Hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to other 
transaction parties 
 81.3 %     82.1 %    85.2 %   75.0 %  71.4 % 
(d) Hiring such law firm 
signals trustworthiness and 
credibility to potential 
investors 
74.7 %     75.0 %   77.8 %    70.0 %    42.9 %
 
 
3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that apply):  
 
 Lawyers 











(a) In all complex or unusual 
transactions      98.6 %   100.0 %      96.2 %  100.0 %     85.7 %  
(b) In all transactions 
involving large dollar 
amounts 
 68.9 %    71.4 %      76.9 %  55.0 %     64.3 %  
(c) In all transactions where 
the transaction parties put a 
premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility 
 62.2 %     64.3 %    80.8 %   35.0 %  42.9 % 
(d) In all transactions where 
potential investors put a 
premium on trustworthiness 
and credibility 
62.2 %     60.7 %    76.9 %    45.0 %     57.1 %
(e) In all transactions where 
opposing parties hire highly 
reputed law firms 
44.6 %  53.6 %  42.3 %  35.0 %  42.9 % 
 
  
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) Are as willing to be hired 
for unusual transactions as 
for more typical transactions 
  90.3 %  92.3 %       88.9 %  89.5 %    100.0 %  
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(b) Are sometimes reluctant 
to be hired for unusual 
transactions 
8.3 %     7.7 %      11.1 %  5.3 %     0.0 %   
(c) May be biased against 
innovating changes in 
transactions 
9.7 %     3.9 %    14.8 %   10.5 %  12.5 % 
(d) Are not biased against 
innovating changes in the 
transactions 
  83.3 %   96.2 %    74.1 %    78.9 %     68.9 %
 
 
5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information provided by 
another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, as opposed to where 
that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) Should trust that 
information much more    1.3 %    3.6 %       0.0 %  0.0 %      0.0 %  
(b) Should trust that 
information somewhat more  30.7 %   25.0 %      29.6 %   40.0 %     17.7 %  
(c) Should have no greater 
trust in that information  68.0 %     71.4%    70.4 %  60.0 %    82.4 % 
 
 
C. Creating Economies of Scope 
 
1.  To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    0.0 %    0.0 %      0.0 %  0.0 %     5.9 %  
(b) To a significant extent  1.4 %     3.6 %    0.0 %  0.0 %      5.9 %  
(c) To some extent   45.9 %     39.3 %   50.0 %  50.0 %   58.8 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  52.7 %  57.1 %  50.0 %  50.0 %  29.4 % 
 
 
2.  Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:    
 
3.  To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must, and you 















(a) To a great extent  8.0 %     3.6 %       11.1 %   10.0 %    13.3 %  
(b) To a significant extent  22.7 %     28.6 %      14.8 %  25.0 %     13.3 %  
(c) To some extent   28.0 %     21.4 %   25.9 %  40.0 %   33.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  41.3 %  46.4 %  48.1 %  25.0 %  40.0 % 
 
 
4.  To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent   24.0 %    32.1 %       22.2 %  15.0 %    0.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent  24.0 %     17.9 %      25.9 %     30.0 %  21.4 %  
(c) To some extent  33.3 %     32.1 %    29.6 %   40.0 %    50.0 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  18.7 %  17.9 %  22.2 %  15.0 %  28.6 % 
 
 
5.  Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:   
 
 Lawyers 











Yes    90.1 %   96.2 %       84.0%    90.0 %   84.6 %  
No    9.9 %    3.9 %      16.0%     10.0 %   15.4 %  
 
 
6.  Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:      
 
 Lawyers 











Yes  41.3 %     39.3 %       37.0 %  50.0 %      64.7 %  
No    42.7 %   42.9 %      37.0 %  50.0 %     17.6 %  




7.  When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good 
relationships with opposing counsel?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    66.7 %  67.9 %       66.7 %  65.0 %    37.5 %  
(b) To a significant extent  28.0 %     28.6 %      22.2 %  35.0 %     31.3 %  
(c) To some extent   5.3 %     3.6 %    11.1 %  0.0 %   31.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 % 
 
 
8.  (Question for clients only) To what extent does involving your lawyer in that non-legal work 




(a) To a great extent    0.0 % 
(b) To a significant extent  0.0 %   
(c) To some extent   35.7 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  64.3 % 
 
 
D.  Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality   
 
1.  To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?: 
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent   42.7 %    46.4 %       63.0 %  10.0 %      25.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent  24.0 %   17.9 %     11.1 %  50.0 %      43.8 %  
(c) To some extent  29.3 %     25.0 %   25.9 %  40.0 %     31.3 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  4.0 %  10.7 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 % 
 
 















(a) To a great extent    12.0 %   7.1 %      25.9 %    0.0 %   12.5 %  
(b) To a significant extent  13.3 %     14.3 %      18.5 %     5.0 %   12.5 %  
(c) To some extent  34.7 %    28.6 %    29.6 %   50.0 %    37.5 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  40.0 %  50.0 %  25.9 %  45.0 %    37.5 %
(e) The attorney-client 
privilege works against 
facilitating transactions (for 
example, by increasing 
information asymmetry 
among transaction parties) 
1.3 %  3.6 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  0.0 % 
 
 
E.  Reducing Transaction Costs   
 
1.  What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or reviewing 
legal opinions?:   
 











Average   6.47 %  6.10 %   7.56 %    5.53 %   14.6 %
Median  5 %   5 %    5 %  5 %    10.0 %
Standard Deviation   4.80  4.14    6.23   3.08     13.3 
 
 
2.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client against, 
possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    50.0 %   48.2%       51.9 %  50.0 %      41.2 %  
(b) To a significant extent  28.4 %     33.3 %      25.9 %  25.0 %       35.3 %  
(c) To some extent  20.3 %     14.8 %    22.2 %  25.0 %     17.7 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  1.4 %  3.7 %  0.0 %  0.0 %     5.9 % 
 
 
3.  To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client against, 















(a) To a great extent  25.0 %     26.9 %       34.6 %  10.0 %      29.4 %  
(b) To a significant extent  25.0 %     26.9 %      19.2%  30.0 %      11.8 %  
(c) To some extent  33.3 %     34.6 %    30.8 %  35.0 %   35.3 % 
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  16.7 %  11.5 %  15.4 %  25.0 %  23.5 % 
 
 
4.  To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    9.3 %    14.3 %       3.7 %   10.0 %     0.0 %  
(b) To a significant extent   24.0 %   21.4 %      25.9 %    25.0 %    6.3 %  
(c) To some extent  36.0 %    32.1 %    40.7 %  35.0 %     31.3 %
(d)  To a small extent or not 
at all  30.7 %  32.1 %  29.6 %  30.0 %    62.5 %
 
 
F.  Reducing Regulatory Costs   
 
1.  To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    23.0 % 21.4 %      19.2 % %    30.0 %    17.7 %  
(b) To a significant extent   70.3 %    75.0 %      65.4 %     70.0 %   58.8 %  
(c) To a small extent  6.8 %      3.6 %    15.4 %  0.0 %     23.5 %
 
 
2.  To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government than an 
ordinary business corporation? 
 
 Lawyers 











(a) To a great extent    8.2%    11.5 %      11.0 %   0.0 %     29.4 %  
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(b) To a significant extent    20.5 %   26.9 %      18.5 %  15.0 %      29.4 %  
(c) To a small extent  54.8 %     53.9 %    55.6 %  55.0 %     23.5 %
(d)  Not at all  16.4 %  7.7 %  14.8 %  30.0 %    17.7 %
 
 
3.  When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what extent 
do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory concerns?:   
 
 Lawyers 











(a) In detail    32.4 %   33.3 %       42.3 %  16.7 %      47.1 %  
(b) Only sufficiently to know 
when to alert regulatory 
counsel to the possibility of 
legal issues 
56.3 %     63.0 %      34.6 %  77.8 %      52.9 %  
(c) Other  9.9 %      3.7 %   19.2 %   5.6 %    n/a 
 
 
4.  When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which of the 
following statements are true (mark all that are true)?: 
 
 Lawyers 











(a) You need to provide 
expertise in the law and 
regulations that generally 
govern that type of 
transaction 
93.2 %    88.9 %     92.6 %    100.0 %    94.1 %  
(b) You need to understand 
the rationale for the 
contractual provisions in the 
transaction documents 
  97.3 %   100.0 %     96.3 %   95.0 %     88.2 %  
(c) Other  29.7 %     22.2 %   33.3 %  35.0 %     n/a 
 
 
 
 